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PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Within- and Between-Culture Variation: Individual Differences and the
Cultural Logics of Honor, Face, and Dignity Cultures
Angela K.-Y. Leung
Singapore Management University
Dov Cohen
University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign
The CuPS (Culture  Person  Situation) approach attempts to jointly consider culture and
individual differences, without treating either as noise and without reducing one to the other. Culture
is important because it helps define psychological situations and create meaningful clusters of
behavior according to particular logics. Individual differences are important because individuals
vary in the extent to which they endorse or reject a culture’s ideals. Further, because different
cultures are organized by different logics, individual differences mean something different in each.
Central to these studies are concepts of honor-related violence and individual worth as being
inalienable versus socially conferred. We illustrate our argument with 2 experiments involving
participants from honor, face, and dignity cultures. The studies showed that the same “type” of
person who was most helpful, honest, and likely to behave with integrity in one culture was the
“type” of person least likely to do so in another culture. We discuss how CuPS can provide a
rudimentary but integrated approach to understanding both within- and between-culture variation.
Keywords: culture, individual differences, within-culture variation, between-culture variation, honor,
face, dignity
There are two indisputable facts about human behavior: (a) There
can be wide differences in behavior between people of different
cultures, and (b) within any given culture, individuals can vary widely
from each other. And, as has often been observed, one person’s data
are another person’s noise. Thus, those who study cultural differences
sometimes do not pay much attention to individual variation or treat
it as error, and those who study individual differences sometimes do
not pay much attention to cultural variation.
In the present article, we sketch out an approach that, in a
rudimentary way, addresses both within- and between-culture vari-
ation. It considers individual differences and cultural variation
jointly, without reducing one to the other. That is, it considers
culture neither as “personality writ large” nor individual differ-
ences as “culture writ small.” The approach examines individual
differences, showing that people vary in the extent to which they
internalize or endorse a cultural ideal. And it examines cultural
differences, showing how cultures help define psychological situ-
ations and create different clusters of behavior according to dif-
fering logics. In this approach, individuals are always in a cultural
context, but they are not always of it.
We describe a Culture  Person  Situation approach (abbre-
viated as CuPS). There are no asocial people. There are no acul-
tural situations. Thus, culture, person, and situation are all consid-
ered together. The approach blends one very useful way of
thinking about personality (Mischel, Mendoza-Denton, and col-
leagues’ Person  Situation interactionism) with one very useful
way of thinking about culture (Triandis’s notion of a cultural
syndrome) to attempt to give an integrated account of within- and
between-culture variation.
The first part of this introduction outlines the general ratio-
nale for a CuPS approach. As noted below, taking a CuPS
approach requires understanding the particular logics of the
cultures under study. Thus, in the second part of this introduc-
tion, we outline the contexts and logics of three different
cultural syndromes (a culture of dignity, a culture of honor, and
a culture of face). These three syndromes are contrasted with
respect to the meaning and importance given to norms of
exchange, reciprocity, punishment, honesty, and trustworthi-
ness. In the third part, we apply the CuPS approach to the three
particular syndromes and use them to make predictions about
patterns of within- and between-group variability that we ex-
pected to see in our experiments.
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Part 1: The CuPS Approach Blends Personality and
Cultural Psychology
The Importance of Understanding Psychological
Meanings and Cultural Logics
Mischel and colleagues’ Person  Situation approach derives
from the observation that whereas a person may not show huge
consistency in behavior across situations, that person may show
great consistency within a given situation across time (Mischel,
1990). Thus, across all situations, Ivan may be no more aggressive
than Dmitry on average. However, Ivan may be more aggressive in
response to authority or against his parents, whereas Dmitry may
be more aggressive with peers or in competitive situations. Impor-
tantly, situations are not simply defined nominally (“in the park,”
“at lunch”); rather, situations are defined psychologically (“in
response to authority,” “when vying for status”) in terms of their
psychological meanings to the actor (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; for
an application to culture, see Mendoza-Denton & Mischel, 2007).
This emphasis on psychological meanings bridges the gap to
culture, and more particularly, to the notion of a cultural syndrome
(Triandis, 1994). A syndrome is not simply like a trait (e.g.,
“people in Culture X are extroverted”). A syndrome is more like a
constellation of shared beliefs, values, behaviors, practices, and so
on that are organized around a central theme (e.g., cultural themes
of individualism and collectivism or those about face vs. honor;
Triandis, 1994; see also Adams & Markus, 2004). A particular
cultural logic weaves together various scripts, behaviors, practices,
and cultural patterns around this central theme, giving them a
meaning and a certain logical consistency and coherence for the
people of a culture—even if they may not appear consistent or
coherent to people outside the culture, whose worldviews may be
organized around a different theme by a different cultural logic.
Because the logic of one culture may contradict the logic of
another culture, people standing outside a given culture often do
not “get it.” They fail to understand the sense or coherence in the
behavior of people in that other culture. For example, those outside
an honor culture may wonder, “How come they are so polite and
quick to be helpful and generous but also so ready to use vio-
lence?” or “How come he’ll be my friend forever, but he’ll kill me
if I insult his mother?” Conversely, those of an honor culture may
look at those of a dignity culture and ask, “How can they pride
themselves on their integrity and yet be so spineless?” Or those of
a face culture may look at those of a dignity culture and ask, “How
can those people be so trustworthy and yet also be so selfish and
self-centered?”, whereas those of a dignity culture may look at
those of a face culture and ask, “How can they be good for their
word when they haven’t got a sturdy inner sense of self and are so
dependent on getting other people to like them?” and so on.
Individual Variability Within a Culture
Cultural syndromes are carried forward in situations, institu-
tions, and the heads and bodies of individuals (Cohen & Leung,
2009). Yet, just as culture is not “personality writ large” (Benedict,
2006b), people are also not simply “culture writ small.” Individ-
uals may buy into the dominant theme of their culture, or they may
reject it. Those who reject it are sometimes considered “error” by
those who study culture. However, we should not hastily consider
such individuals “error,” because their behavior is not in fact
random: Individuals are always within a cultural system. That
system has defined certain clusters of behavior as going together.
And even when individuals reject the dominant cultural syndrome,
they create their lives guided at least in part by predefined cultural
templates that have already clustered certain sets of behaviors as
being similar in meaning.
Psychologists who study culture with a focus on prototypical
members of that culture may end up ignoring a great deal of
individual variation (for exceptions, see, e.g., Allport, 1961;
Benet-Martı´nez & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, 2003; Benet-Martı´nez,
Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002; Fu et al., 2007; Oishi, 2004; Triandis,
Chan, Bhawuk, & Iwao, 1995). However, those who study indi-
vidual differences alone may ignore the way those differences
become meaningful only within a cultural system. Because differ-
ent cultural syndromes create different clusters of behavior accord-
ing to their own cultural logics, an individual difference may
predict one sort of behavior in Culture 1 and a very different sort
of behavior (perhaps even the opposite behavior) in Culture 2.
Blending personality and cultural psychology into the CuPS ap-
proach allows one to study individual variation in a cultural
context—without reducing a culture to just its prototypical mem-
bers and without viewing individuals as asocial, acultural beings
operating outside any influence from larger systems of meaning.
Part 2: The Cultural Logics of Dignity, Honor, and
Face Systems
In the CuPS approach, taking culture into consideration means
paying attention to the particular cultural logics of the cultures
under study. This is in contrast to more traditional approaches that
consider individual differences and culture. For example, a more
traditional approach might try to (a) find a cultural difference in
Behavior Y, (b) find a relevant individual-level variable X that
both predicts Y and differs in its mean level across cultures, and
then (c) show that the individual-level variable mediates the cross-
cultural effect. Such an approach tends to do two things. First, it
places culture completely within the person (rather than in person–
environment interactions). Second, it implicitly relies on using one
(presumably universal) cultural logic because it assumes that Vari-
able X uniformly predicts Y within both cultures.
The CuPS approach, however, considers the possibility of mul-
tiple cultural logics, with Variable X potentially meaning very
different things to people in different cultural systems. Thus, in
this approach, Variable X may predict a given behavior in one
culture, and it may predict the opposite type of behavior in another
culture. If Variable X is an individual difference variable, then the
same “type” of person may behave in opposite ways in different
cultures. (And conversely, opposite “types” of people may end up
behaving the same way in different cultures.)
To make predictions about how an individual difference vari-
able X will predict a behavior Y, it is thus necessary to understand
the particular logics of a cultural system—in this case, the logics
of dignity, honor, and face cultures. The logics of each are self-
contained, but contrasts between these systems as “ideal types”
(Weber, 1997) can be quite informative and are summarized in
Table 1. A thorough description is not possible here. So we instead
concentrate on issues related to two problems that are common to
all societies and that no society can ignore: (a) the problem of
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social order (How can cooperation emerge? Who or what gets to
legitimately use violence and when?) and (b) the problem of
valuation (What is the source of a person’s worth—is it inherent or
is it given by others?; Colson, 1975; Hobbes, 1651/1982; Smith,
1759/1976). More specifically, we focus below on how different
societies, in dealing with these two problems, have come up with
differing ideas about morality, exchange, reciprocity, punishment,
and the inalienable versus socially conferred worth of the individ-
ual.
Ideal Type 1: Cultures of Dignity
The logic of dignity is familiar to most readers, because it is the
logic of modern American/Western culture (see Berger, Berger, &
Kellner, 1973, p. 88, who used the term in describing “modern
consciousness”). Dignity is defined in theory (even if not always in
practice) as “the conviction that each individual at birth possessed
an intrinsic value at least theoretically equal to that of every other
person” (Ayers, 1984, p. 19). Thus, the key idea is that each
individual has inherent worth, and this worth does not depend on
the esteem of other people. This worth is neither conferred by
others nor can it be taken away by them. As such, it is inalienable.
Accordingly, dignity is relatively impervious to insults and
threats from others. “Sticks and stones may break my bones, but
names will never hurt me” would be a dignity motto. Ayers’s
(1984, p. 20) metaphor is that “Dignity might be likened to an
internal skeleton, to a hard structure at the center of the self.” The
locus of dignity is thus deep inside the individual, as is the
individual’s moral center. A person with a sense of dignity is a
sturdy person who will behave according to his or her own internal
standards, rather than being driven by impulse or the whims of the
situation. The internal sturdiness and integrity keeps the individual
from being corrupted by other people, and it also guarantees that
a person will behave rightly, whether or not his or her good
behavior will be seen by others. As a device for self-control, guilt
(the pang of internal conscience) is considered more important
than shame (which implies a real or imagined audience; see also
Benedict, 2006a; Kashima et al., 2004; Y.-H. Kim & Cohen,
2010).
Systems of exchange in dignity cultures are most compatible
with those of a market economy (Ayers, 1984). Markets and the
idea of dignity both grow in the same fertile soil: an egalitarian
system of autonomous individuals, guided by conscience but also
backed up by an effective system of law that can enforce contracts
and property rights and protect individuals from predation and
violence (Henrich et al., 2006; Smith, 1759/1976). Positive reci-
procity—often in the form of short-run tit-for-tat exchanges—is
important in such systems, both because it is morally correct
(a sign of integrity and trustworthiness) and because it is rational—
being part of “self-interest, rightly understood” (Tocqueville,
1840/2010). However, reciprocity does not have the acknowledged
overwhelming importance that it does in other systems, where
positive reciprocity (as in gift exchange) tends to be a “total social
fact” (Mauss, 2000) or where negative reciprocity (as in the
willingness to punish those who have crossed you) is necessary for
self-defense (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Miller, 1990, 1993).
Ideal Type 2: Cultures of Honor
In contrast to dignity’s emphasis on internal, inalienable worth,
honor, as a claim to precedence and to virtue, has both an external
and an internal quality. It is “the value of a person in his own eyes,
but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own
worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgment of that
claim . . . his right to pride” (Pitt-Rivers, 1966, p. 21; see also
IJzerman, van Dijk, & Gallucci, 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera,
Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008; Uskul, Cross, Sunbay,
Gercek-Swing, & Ataca, 2009). Honor must be claimed, and honor
must be paid by others. A person who claims honor but is not paid
honor does not in fact have honor.
Table 1
Ideal Types: The Contexts and Cultural Logics of Dignity, Honor, and Face Cultures
“Ideal type” of culture Dignity Honor Face
Internal/external valuation
of the self? Internal External/both Mostly external
Belongs to Everyone Some You have it, unless you lose it
Can it be lost? No (or at least, it cannot be taken
by others)
Yes—can be lost or gained; may also
be appropriated by a competitor
Yes
Context Autonomous, independent people Competitive environment of rough
equals (Miller, 1993)
Hierarchy (see Heine et al., 1999)
Interactions and
exchanges
Contract among equals or a
moderate version of tit-for-tat
Very strong reciprocity norms
(potentially competitive,
escalating)
Guided by status lines within hierarchy;
particularistic; strong reciprocity norms
What guarantees good
behavior?
(Internal) guilt over one’s own
actions; (external) effective
system of law
Shame; violations of one person by
another call for direct retribution
by the victim (not by a third party
or the state)
Loss of face/shame; punishment given by
a superior or by the group; direct
punishment by victim is disruptive,
inappropriate
Rationality/irrationality Either Committed to irrationality (at least in
terms of abhorring short-run cost–
benefit calculations)
Either
Untrustworthy people are
those . . .
Without a sturdiness coming from
a strong internal sense of
dignity
Without a concern for honor,
opinions of others
Without a concern for face, opinions of
others
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Cultures of honor tend to originate in “lawless” environments,
where a weak (or nonexistent) state is unable to enforce contracts,
protect individuals from predation, or punish the guilty. In such
environments, payback becomes an organizing theme. An honor-
able person is trustworthy and can be counted on to pay back his
or her debts. And an honorable person demands respect, will not
tolerate being cheated or affronted, and will pay back wrongs done
to him or her (Miller, 1993). What people from dignity cultures
typically do not understand is that positive reciprocity and negative
reciprocity go together in the logic of an honor culture. Reciproc-
ity—the willingness to pay back the good as well as the bad—is
one aspect of what unifies honor-as-virtue with honor-as-
precedence (Cohen & Leung, 2010; O’Neill, 1999).
Insults take on special importance in honor cultures, because
they are probes or tests of who can do what to whom. A person
who establishes that he will not tolerate even small slights estab-
lishes that he cannot be pushed around on big issues either (Daly
& Wilson, 1988; IJzerman et al., 2007). In the absence of state
protection, self-protection through violence or the credible threat
of violence is necessary: A reputation for toughness deters com-
petitors who would enhance their own honor or claim to prece-
dence by taking some of yours. This logic has recreated cultures of
honor in many different social environments:
Whenever the authority of law is questioned or ignored, the code of
honor reemerges to allocate the right to precedence and dictate the
principles of conduct: as among aristocracies and criminal under-
worlds, school boy and street corner societies, open frontiers and the
closed communities where reigns “The Honorable Society,” as the
Mafia calls itself. (Pitt-Rivers, 1968, p. 510)
Honor is unlike dignity in that honor has internal and external
qualities that can be difficult to separate. Unlike inalienable dig-
nity, honor can also be gained or it can be taken away, often
through direct competition with others. And finally, honor is also
dedicated to short-term “irrationality” in that it abhors cost–benefit
calculations. Honor guarantees right conduct and reciprocity re-
gardless of “rationality,” whether that means acting spitefully by
risking life and limb in a fight to pay back an insult or making a
grand gesture purely for the sake of principle (as in the story of
Abraham Lincoln walking 6 miles to return a penny). What those
outside honor cultures may not understand is that gaining a repu-
tation for reciprocity (and a willingness to be “irrational” in the
short run) may be beneficial and ultimately most rational in the
long run in environments where honor establishes one as both
trustworthy and not to be messed with (Nesse, 2001).
Ideal Type 3: Cultures of Face
Face is defined essentially by what other people see. Thus, face
is like honor in that the sentiments of other people are extremely
important. Like honor, face also can involve a claim to virtue or to
prestige. However, the settings—and consequently, the role expec-
tations—are quite different for cultures of honor and cultures of
face. Whereas honor is contested in a competitive environment of
rough equals, face exists in settled hierarchies that are essentially
cooperative.
Ho (1976, p. 883; see also Heine, 2001) defined face as “the
respectability and/or deference which a person can claim . . . by
virtue of [his or her] relative position” in a hierarchy and the
proper fulfillment of his or her role. Thus, everyone in the hierar-
chy can have some face, though some may have more than others
due to their position. Implicitly, people have face—unless they
lose it. A person can “gain” face, and one person can “give face”
to another, but the major focus is primarily on not losing face
(Hamamura, Meijer, Heine, Kamaya, & Hori, 2009). This is re-
flected in the expression “saving face,” a saying that came into
English from British expatriates living in China (“Face,” 2003).
Because face exists within a stable hierarchy, it is not compet-
itive or zero sum. In an honor culture, one person may take
another’s honor and appropriate it as his or her own; however, one
cannot increase one’s face by taking another’s. In a face culture,
people are obliged to work together to preserve each other’s face,
and because it is bad form to cause another to lose face, formalities
are carefully observed, and direct conflicts are avoided (Gelfand,
Lim, & Raver, 2004; Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Gelfand et
al., 2001; Sanchez-Burks & Mor Barak, 2004). If one person
openly aggrieves another, it disrupts the harmony and order of the
system. And unlike in honor cultures, it is not incumbent on the
victim to directly redress the grievance him- or herself. Direct
retaliation by the victim is unnecessary because the group or a
superior is able to punish the offender; in fact, direct retaliation
would be undesirable because it would further upset the harmony
of the system.
The 3 H’s of a face culture are thus hierarchy, humility, and
harmony (see discussion in Y.-H. Kim & Cohen, 2010; Y.-H. Kim,
Cohen, & Au, 2010). People are supposed to show appropriate
deference to hierarchy. They are supposed to display humility and
not overreach on status claims (lest they learn a painful and
humiliating lesson about how much status others are willing to
accord them). And they are to pursue, or at least not disturb, the
harmony of the system.
Shame is the punishment for bad behavior in a system of face.
Those who do not have enough concern for their face and the good
opinion of others will behave selfishly or inappropriately. They
may also be boorish and not sensitive enough to fulfill their
particularistic obligations to peers, subordinates, superiors, or oth-
ers to whom they owe loyalty. Someone not concerned with face
will be insensitive to its loss. Such people cannot be shamed or are
shameless.
Part 3: Overview of Studies
The sections above sketched out dignity, honor, and face as
ideal types. Ideal types rarely exist in the world. Instead, many
societies are an amalgam. In the current study, we included Anglo
Americans from the North of the United States, Anglo Americans
from the South of the United States, Latinos, and Asian Ameri-
cans. All participants were Americans, and all were familiar with
notions of dignity, honor, and face. We speak of our participants
not as coming from different societies, but as people whose rela-
tive familiarity with motivational systems of dignity (Northerners),
honor (Southerners and Latinos), and face (Asian Americans)
differs (for reviews, see, e.g., Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, & Leung,
2007; Hamamura & Heine, 2008; Y.-H. Kim et al., 2010; Triandis,
1994; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). People within each subgroup
may buy into the salient cultural syndrome of their subgroup, or
they may reject it. Either way, they are influenced by that syn-
drome, because that syndrome has a cultural logic that has clus-
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tered certain behaviors as going together, and individuals pattern
their lives at least in part according to these culturally predefined
clusters.
In the current studies, we examine clusters of behavior pertain-
ing to positive reciprocity (returning a favor, paying back debts),
negative reciprocity (endorsing violence in response to insults,
paying back threats), and virtue (honesty, trustworthiness, and
integrity), as well as the belief in the inalienable versus socially
conferred valuation of the person. The sketches above suggest that,
among those from honor cultures (Southerners and Latinos), no-
tions of reciprocity (both positive and negative) and virtue are
organized around the logic of honor. Aggressive behavior in one
situation may go together with helping behavior in another situa-
tion, because both are clustered by the principle of reciprocity
salient within the honor logic (i.e., negative reciprocity to an insult
and positive reciprocity to a favor, respectively). Similarly, ag-
gressive behavior in one situation may go together with honest
behavior in another situation, because both are organized around
the honor logic (Cohen & Leung, 2010).
In Experiment 1, we examine whether people from an honor
culture (Southerners and Latinos) who most endorse honor-related
aggression will be more likely to show positive reciprocity in
repaying a favor (consistent with the honor logic). In contrast,
among people from a face or dignity culture (Asian Americans and
Northern Anglo Americans), aggressive behavior in one situation
may go together with not helping, because such behaviors are
indicators of one’s selfishness, immaturity, or egotism. Thus, we
expect that those Northern Anglos and Asian Americans who most
endorse aggression will also be less likely to show positive reci-
procity by going out of their way to repay a favor.
In Experiment 2, we study another virtue—honesty or trustwor-
thiness—as we examine whether participants will cheat on a
“memory test” to win money. More important, though, in Exper-
iment 2 we manipulated the salience of the honor ideal to (a)
examine the causal role that honor ideals play and (b) illustrate in
dynamic fashion the way that people react toward or against salient
cultural ideals that have “packaged” certain behaviors as going
together. Thus, for example, we examine how Latinos and South-
ern Anglos who reject honor-related violence behave very differ-
ently when they react to dignity as the salient ideal (and they are
thus endorsers of dignity) compared with when they react against
honor as the salient ideal (and they are thus rejecters of honor).
Finally, the contrast between concepts of dignity (which em-
phasizes the inalienable, inherent worth of the individual) and face
or honor (which emphasize one’s worth in the eyes of others) leads
to another set of predictions examined in the two experiments. In
a motivational system of dignity, it is sturdy, steadfast internal
strength that leads to correct behavior—uncorrupted by others or
by concerns of expediency. In a motivational system of face or
honor, seeking the good opinion of others (rather than relying
solely on solipsistic self-evaluation) promotes virtue. Thus, among
Northern Anglo Americans, those who hold that a person’s worth
is inalienable (rather than socially conferred) should show more
prosocial reciprocity and more honest and trustworthy behavior. In
contrast, among Southerners, Latinos, and Asian Americans, those
who hold that worth must be socially conferred might show more
prosocial reciprocity, honesty, and trustworthiness.
In sum, the “behavioral signatures” (or clusters of behavior) most
prevalent in the honor group should be different than those most
prevalent in the dignity and face groups when it comes to understand-
ing how positive and negative reciprocity fit together. Similarly, the
behavioral signatures most prevalent in the dignity group should
be different than those most prevalent in the face and honor groups
when it comes to understanding how virtue is driven by concerns
with inalienable versus socially conferred worth (Mendoza-Denton
& Mischel, 2007). Across Experiments 1 and 2, the type of person
who has integrity and pays back favors and debts in one cultural
group may be very different—even opposite—in type from the
person who does so in another group.1
1 A brief note on theoretical and empirical methodology: In this intro-
duction, we have sketched out dignity, honor, and face cultures as “ideal
types” (Weber, 1997). There is, of course, much more to these cultures than
is sketched out above. We have used the method of ideal types not to
capture everything about these cultures but to capture some of the essential
“family resemblance” features (Wittgenstein, 2009) that are important for
the present purposes. Within an ideal type, each culture may have distinct
features. Honor cultures, for example, are not homogenous. In all honor
cultures, insult and affront are matters of extreme seriousness—though
some may be more hair trigger, retaliating at the faintest whiff of an insult,
whereas others are more slow to anger, retaliating only after a clear line has
been crossed (Anderson, 1994; Cohen, Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla,
1999). In honor cultures, there is competition within a status group among
rough equals, who may appropriate each other’s honor—though some
honor cultures may have caste-like structures separating different status
groups, while in others a rough equality may pervade society. In honor
cultures, self-help justice is the ruling principle; an entity whose honor is
violated cannot appeal to any overarching authority to give it justice—
though cultures vary in how much claims to honor are vested in, and must
be defended by, collective entities (such as clans, extended families, and so
on) versus individual persons. Honor cultures also vary in how paramount
female chastity and fidelity are—and in who is punished for breaches of
this fidelity (Vandello & Cohen, 2003, 2008), and so on.
In addition, cultures of all types have common features that derive from
human sociality—people cooperate; they compete; they want to belong and
be accepted by others; they have some sense of self. The differences among
types of cultures should not obscure commonalities. Indeed, there are
probably many universal ideals that all cultures venerate. However, (a) not
all good things can be maximized at the same time; some universal ideals
are opposing; and different cultural traditions represent the elevation of
some ideals over others (Shweder, 2000). And (b) even when cultures
agree in their rhetoric about various ideals, cultural traditions differ in how
they see various ideals as realized.
Relevant to this last point is a matter of empirical methodology. The
anthropologist Mary Douglas has described the phenomenon of stolen
rhetoric, by which all cultures pay homage to the same values but mean
vastly different things when they talk about them. As an abstract proposi-
tion, people in many cultures will endorse the idea that a person should
have “honor” or “dignity,” will agree that “losing face” is bad, and may
even use terms such as honor, face, and dignity interchangeably. For the
present purposes then, what is needed is a measure that does not ask about
these values in a highly abstract sense but one that concretizes two of the
key issues we have discussed above (namely, [a] the legitimacy of using
violence in response to threat or affront and b the sense that personal
worth is internal vs. socially conferred). The measures we use are still
paper-and-pencil and so have the usual problems associated with such
measures (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Peng, Nisbett, &
Wong, 1997). However, they at least lessen the problem of stolen rhetoric
by concretizing the concepts in our measurements (see also Cohen, 2007).
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Experiment 1: Honor-Related Violence, Dignity, and
Prosocial Reciprocity: A Mini-Odyssey Through the
Psychology Building
In the present experiment, we examined how positive reciproc-
ity was related to (a) the approval of honor-related violence and (b)
the belief that an individual’s worth is inalienable (part of the
dignity ideal) versus socially conferred (part of the face and honor
ideals). The honor violence and inalienable versus socially con-
ferred worth measures were both collected during the experimental
session. However, the measure of positive reciprocity occurred
after the study had ostensibly ended, with participants trying to
find and help one of the confederates who either had or had not
offered them some pieces of candy earlier. The help involved
finding the confederate to tell her that she had left her “lost”
computer disk on a desk outside the laboratory. Tracking down this
confederate in order to inform her was no easy matter, though, and
participants had a number of points at which they could decide to
either abandon their search or to continue on. Our dependent
variable was the participant’s actual expenditure of effort to help
return the disk to the confederate.
The first prediction is that among those from an honor culture
(Southerners and Latinos), those who endorse retributive violence
most will also show the greatest prosocial reciprocity, following the
salient theme of payback in an honor culture. However, the reverse
should be true among those from face and dignity cultures (Asian
Americans and Northern Anglos), because endorsing violence is more
of an indicator of one’s selfishness, immaturity, or egotism for them.
The second prediction is that among those from a dignity culture,
those who most endorse the ideal of inalienable worth should show
the greatest prosocial reciprocity. However, this should not hold or
might reverse among those from face and honor cultures, because a
belief in inalienable worth—unaffected by the opinions of others—is
not necessarily a marker for sturdiness or integrity.
Method
Participants. Participants were 119 University of Illinois
students—35 Northern Anglos composed our dignity group, 34
Asian Americans composed our face group, and 20 Southern
Anglos and 30 Latinos composed our honor group. Students who
had lived in the South for at least 6 years were considered South-
ern.2 The percentages of females (males) in our dignity, honor, and
face groups were 46% (54%), 50% (50%), and 50% (50%), re-
spectively. In Experiments 1 and 2, data for men and women
generally looked quite similar, so the analyses were collapsed
across gender. Further, in both experiments, our two honor groups
(Latinos and Southerners) were quite similar for the primary
analyses of interest, so the analyses below combined these two
groups into one honor group.3 (For analyses in Experiments 1 and
2, all interactions involving a Latino vs. Southerner dummy vari-
able were not significant.)
Procedure. One participant and two confederates (of the same
gender as the participant) arrived at the lab and were told that this
study examined people’s perception of violence in the media and how
social situations might affect such perception. They first had a brief
get-acquainted task and then watched several film clips and filled out
a questionnaire asking what they thought of the violence in the film.
Introducing the disk and the reciprocity manipulation. Be-
fore the clips started, we introduced two experimental manipula-
tions. One was our disk type manipulation. As one of the confed-
erates (who we call the disk confederate) unpacked her bag to find
a pen, she took out a brightly colored computer disk and “acci-
dentally” knocked it on the floor at the participant’s feet. This act
was meant to draw the participant’s attention to the disk. In the
important disk condition, the disk label showed “[The confeder-
ate’s first name]—Term Paper [appropriate semester],” and when
the confederate got the disk back, she said, “Oh! This is my term
paper disk. I’ve finished part of it. I’m gonna work on it tonight.”
In the unimportant disk condition, the label showed “[The confed-
erate’s first name]—Softball schedule 2002—can erase,” and
when she got the disk back, she said, “Oh! This is just my old
softball schedule disk. Anyway, the event is already over.” The
other, more important manipulation was our reciprocity manipu-
lation. After learning that the experiment involved watching mov-
ies, either the disk confederate or the other confederate (who we
call the distraction confederate) pulled out a bag of candies
(mostly Hershey’s assorted candies) and offered some to her
fellow participants. If the participant did not accept on the first
offer, the offerer would encourage her to take some by saying
“Come on, they’re really good. You can grab some and save for
later if you don’t want to eat now.” If the participant still declined,
the confederate asked, “Are you sure?” No further offer was made,
as the gesture was meant to sound friendly and natural, rather than
pushy.
In the reciprocity condition, the disk confederate offered the can-
dies, because after the study was over, the participant would have an
opportunity to help out the disk confederate. In the nonreciprocity
condition, the distraction confederate offered the candies.
Getting the endorsement of honor violence and the endorse-
ment of inalienable versus socially conferred worth measures.
After a brief icebreaker task, participants watched a series of film
clips in which the protagonists were affronted and responded with
violence. Our measure of endorsement of honor violence was
based on how justified participants thought the violence in the film
clips was (see the Measures section). After each clip, the experi-
menter paused the video to let participants answer questions about
that clip and read the background information for the next clip.
When the movies were completed, participants filled out a ques-
tionnaire that included items related to the endorsement of inalien-
able versus socially conferred worth (see the Measures section)
and some demographic items.
2 Consistent with previous experimental research and to expand the
Southern sample, the South comprised Southern states as defined by the
census and included Missouri (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996).
Those Illinois participants who were from Springfield or below were also
considered Southern, because Southern culture greatly influenced this
region at the time of settlement. Of the 50 or so counties below Springfield,
all but two were settled by people who came from Tennessee, Kentucky, or
the Carolinas (Atack, 1989). Consequently, many anthropologists, histori-
ans, political scientists, and sociologists consider Southern Illinois to be
part of the South (for support from laboratory experiments, see Cohen et
al., 1999; Vandello & Cohen, 2003, 2004; Vandello, Cohen, Grandon, &
Franiuk, 2009; Vandello, Cohen, & Ransom, 2008).
3 The only exception was one marginally significant effect, such that
Latinos in the unprimed condition of Experiment 2 were less likely to cheat
than Southerners were (t  1.69, p  .10). This effect, however, was
unrelated to the key three-way interaction we tested in Experiment 2.
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The false debriefing, distraction, and lost disk set-up. After
the questionnaire was completed, the study was ostensibly over.
Participants were given a debriefing that repeated the cover story,
and when everyone walked out of the lab, the experimenter did so
as well, locked the door, and left. At this point, we needed to delay
the participant’s exit so that the disk confederate could “lose” the
disk. So, after leaving the lab, the distraction confederate button-
holed the participant, telling her about a walkathon campaign
organized by a cancer research organization and asking for a
pledge. As the distraction confederate occupied the participant, the
disk confederate walked about 15 ft and set down her backpack on
a large desk that blocked off half the hall. The disk confederate
started to unload her backpack, apparently looking for something.
Pulling a small piece of paper from her backpack, the disk con-
federate asked, “Do either of you know where Room 25 is? I’ve
got to meet a study group there in 5 minutes,” thus alerting the
participant to where the disk confederate was going next.
After the participant (or distraction confederate) answered that
Room 25 would be in the basement, the disk confederate then
packed up her backpack, “accidentally” leaving the disk out on the
desk, and headed toward the basement. The distraction confederate
was positioned so that the participant could not see the disk being
“lost,” and she continued to talk to the participant so that the disk
confederate had time to get away. After enough time had elapsed,
the distraction confederate finished talking to the participant,
looked at her watch, and said, “Cool! I might be able to still catch
my TA during office hours.”
Tracking down the disk confederate (or not). As the partic-
ipant and distraction confederate left, they had to walk past the
large desk on which the brightly colored disk had been left. The
participant could either spontaneously notice the disk, or if he or
she did not, the distraction confederate would say, “Hey, isn’t that
[disk confederate’s name]’s disk? She was going to Room 25 in
the basement, right?” A pause was given to see if the participant
would spontaneously offer to find the disk confederate; if not, the
distraction confederate continued, “Well, I’d go to find her and tell
her that she left her disk here, but I’ve gotta run and catch my TA
before office hours are over.”
This interaction in the hallway represented the first decision
point: Would the participant assume responsibility for finding and
alerting the disk confederate? And if so, how eager would the
participant be to do so? If the participant did not volunteer to find
the disk confederate, the experiment ended, and the distraction
confederate debriefed the participant. If the participant did volun-
teer to find the disk confederate (or take the disk to her), the
experiment continued. Participants who assumed responsibility
then needed to go down four floors to the basement and find Room
25—not an easy task, because Room 25 is tucked away past a set
of double doors and down a ramp. Further, the signs in the psychol-
ogy building range from being not helpful to being confusing and
misleading, with a few signs directing participants to the wrong area
of the building or even the wrong floor (see Figure 1).
If participants actually succeeded in finding Room 25, their effort
helping score was 1 point. However, if participants wanted to find the
disk confederate, they were not done, because a sign taped to the door
of Room 25 said, “Meeting moved to Room 841 (8th floor).” At this
point, participants could decide to simply abandon their search by
taking the exit (located tantalizingly nearby) or instead go up the nine
floors to find the disk confederate.
If participants continued the search, they could take the back
staircase up nine floors and they would find Room 841 relatively
quickly. If they took the main staircase or used the elevator, they
would have to go to the building’s farthest point to find the room.
Getting to Room 841 increased participants’ effort helping score
by 1 point.
However, if participants wanted to tell the disk confederate in
person that she had left her disk on the 3rd floor, they were not
done yet. A sign taped to the door of Room 841 said, “Went to get
D C 
 B A
Figure 1. Finding Room 25 is not an easy task. Signs in the psychology building can be confusing (Panels A
and B), somewhat contradictory (Panel C), or occasionally point to the wrong floor (Panel D).
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TV and VCR. Will be back soon.” At this point, participants could
either abandon the search or wait at Room 841. If they waited for
at least 1 min, their effort helping score increased 1 more point,
and the disk confederate, who had been hiding on the 8th floor,
came out to end the experiment and debrief them.
In sum, participants’ scores reflected how much effort they
expended in their travels to find the confederate (0  did not help,
1  went to basement, 2  went to 8th floor, 3  waited at least
1 min on the 8th floor). A few participants did unconventional
things, such as dropping the disk off in the main psychology
department office or the undergraduate advising office. If they did
so, they received a point for every step they completed and a half
point toward the next step (though all results remained significant,
regardless of how these cases were scored).
Measures
Endorsement of honor-related violence. Participants’ rat-
ings on four film clips made up our endorsement of honor index.
The film clips involved the following: (a) A male high school
student is pushed and taunted by a bully, who challenges him to a
fight. The student later punches the bully, knocking him to the
ground. (b) A female high school student (Student A) throws
another female student (Student B) against her locker and hits her
while she is on the floor. The incident comes after Student B has
admitted to sleeping with the boyfriend of Student A’s friend.
Student B also insulted Student A’s friend and called Student A a
psycho. Student A demanded an apology from Student B, who
ignored the demand. (c) At a bar in the Old West, a farmhand
punches a cowboy after that cowboy taunts and provokes him. And
(d) a farmer explains to his wife why he must go to town and have
a gunfight with someone trying to intimidate him and drive him off
his land (a different character from the third clip).
For each clip, participants answered 10 questions such as “If
Character A had not responded with violence, would you respect
him (1  much less, 7  much more)?”, “How justified was
Character A in using violence (1  not at all, 7  extremely
justified)?”, “If Character A had not responded with violence, he
would have (1  been not much of a man, 7  been acting
reasonably),” “Do you think Character B (1  did not deserve to
be punched, 7  deserved to be beaten worse than what he got),”
and so on (for the 40-item index,   .91).
Inalienable versus socially conferred worth. Participants
indicated their agreement or disagreement with four 7-point Likert
scale items that measured their endorsement of the idea that personal
worth is inalienable versus socially conferred. The items we created
were “How others treat me is irrelevant to my worth as a person,”
“How much I respect myself is far, far more important than how much
others respect me,” “No one (except me) can make me feel dimin-
ished,” and “No one can take a person’s self-respect away from him
or her.” Higher numbers indicated greater endorsement of the ideal of
worth as inalienable (an aspect of dignity), whereas lower numbers
indicated greater endorsement of worth as socially conferred (an
aspect of honor or face syndromes; Cronbach’s   .70).
Results
The two key analyses involved Culture  Person  Situation
interactions predicting prosocial reciprocity. The first analysis in-
volved Honor Versus Nonhonor Group (Culture)  Individual En-
dorsement of Violence (Person)  Favor Versus No Favor to Repay
(Situation). The second involved Dignity Group Versus Face/Honor
Group (Culture)  Individual Endorsement of Inalienable Versus
Socially Conferred Worth (Person)  Favor Versus No Favor to
Repay (Situation). Our person-level variables were continuous, and
thus we used multiple regression procedures, standardizing all main
effect variables before creating interaction terms.
CuPS interaction: Honor violence and prosocial reciprocity
in honor and nonhonor groups. Figure 2 displays the signif-
icant three-way Honor Versus Nonhonor Group  Endorsement
of Violence  Favor Versus No Favor to Repay interaction
(b  –.24,   –.25, t  –2.54, p  .01; see Table 2). Thus,
Figure 2. Effort expended to return the “lost” disk by participants from the honor and nonhonor groups, as a
function of the individual’s stance on honor-related violence (1 SD below and above the mean) and whether there
was a favor to repay. Higher numbers indicate greater effort to return the lost disk. The Culture  Person 
Situation (Honor vs. Nonhonor Groups  Honor-Violence Endorsement  Favor vs. No Favor to Repay)
three-way interaction was significant at p  .01. All ps are from regression.
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among participants from an honor culture (Southerners and
Latinos), those who most endorsed payback in the form of
honor-related violence also went the furthest to repay the con-
federate who had given them a gift of candy, compared with
those who rejected honor-related violence. (Centering the cul-
ture variable at the honor group and the situation variable at the
favor to repay values, the simple slope of violence endorsement
was b  .44,   .45, t  2.13, p  .04; Aiken & West, 1991.)
Conversely, among the nonhonor groups (Northern Anglos and
Asian Americans), those who rejected violence expended the
most effort to repay, compared with those who endorsed vio-
lence. (Centering culture at the nonhonor group and situation at
the favor to repay values, the simple slope of violence endorse-
ment was b  –.48,   –.49, t  –2.02, p  .05.) Thus, for the
condition where the disk confederate had given the participant
the candy gift, the simple interaction between Honor Versus
Nonhonor Group  Endorsement of Violence was significant in
predicting effort to repay (b  .45,   .47, t  2.93, p  .004).
In the condition where the disk confederate had not offered any
candy and thus there was no gift to repay, there was no
significant relation between endorsement of honor violence and
effort expended to return the disk for either group (simple
interaction of Honor vs. Nonhonor Group  Endorsement of
Violence was b  –.03, t  – 0.28, p  .78).
CuPS interaction: Endorsement of inalienable versus so-
cially conferred worth and prosocial reciprocity in dignity
versus face/honor groups. The expected three-way CuPS inter-
action between Dignity Versus Nondignity Group  Inalienable
Versus Socially Conferred Worth Favor Versus No Favor to Repay
was also significant in predicting the participant’s effort expended to
help the confederate, as seen in Figure 3 (b  .25,   .25, t  2.69,
p .01; see Table 3). Thus, among participants from a dignity culture
(Northern Anglos), there was an interaction: More endorsement of the
ideal of inalienable worth predicted more effort to help when there
Table 2
Regression Analyses Predicting Participants’ Effort Expended to Help the Disk Confederate for
CuPS Interaction Involving Endorsement of Honor-Related Violence (Experiment 1)
Variable b SE of b  t p
Honor group vs. nonhonor group (C) .03 .09 .03 0.32 .75
Individual endorsement of honor violence (P) .15 .10 .15 1.53 .13
Favor to repay or not (S) .01 .09 .01 0.07 .94
C  S .02 .09 .02 0.22 .83
P  S .02 .09 .02 0.15 .88
C  P .19 .09 .20 2.08 .04
C  P  S .24 .10 .25 2.54 .01
Note. N  119. Change in R2 after adding the Culture  Person  Situation (CuPS) interaction to the model 
.05. All variables standardized before creating interaction terms and entering in the model. Higher numbers for
the variables indicate that the participant was from an honor group (vs. nonhonor group), approved more of
honor-related violence, and did not have a favor to repay.
 p  .05.
Figure 3. Effort expended to return the “lost” disk by participants from the dignity and face/honor groups,
as a function of the individual’s belief in inalienable versus socially conferred worth (1 SD below and above
the mean) and whether there was a favor to repay. Higher numbers indicate greater effort to return the lost
disk. The Culture  Person  Situation (Dignity vs. Face/Honor Groups  Endorsement of Inalienable vs.
Socially Conferred Worth  Favor vs. No Favor to Repay) three-way interaction was significant at p  .01.
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was a favor to repay, compared with when there was no favor to
repay. (Centering culture at the Northern Anglo group, the simple
interaction of Inalienable vs. Socially Conferred Worth  Favor vs.
No Favor to Repay was b  –.43,   –.43, t  –2.56, p  .01.) On
the other hand, for the face and honor groups (Latinos, Southerners,
and Asian Americans), there was no such interaction effect (simple
interaction: b  .11, t  0.99, p  .33).
Further Analyses
Eagerness to help. During the crucial interaction in the hall-
way, we also obtained an attitude measure by having the distraction
confederate rate how eager the participant was to assume responsi-
bility for helping the disk confederate (1  not at all eager to 7 
very eager). Both confederates were blind to hypotheses and to the
participant’s scores on the relevant individual difference variables.
This attitude variable was correlated at .62 with the behavioral mea-
sure of actual effort expended to help, and analyses using this attitude
dependent variable looked similar to analyses using effort expended
as a dependent variable. If one uses multivariate analyses of variance
(MANOVA) to examine attitude toward helping and actual effort
expended, the multivariate tests for both CuPS interactions above
were significant at p .02, with the univariate tests for all attitude and
actual effort dependent variables being significant at p  .01.
Doing good versus getting credit for doing good. The final
act of helping—waiting around on the 8th floor—may be less an
indicator of helping and more an indicator of wanting to “get credit”
for helping. Once at Room 841, participants might have just as easily
written the confederate a note.4 Truncating the dependent variable so
that participants did not receive a point for waiting around gave
similar results to those above. In fact, for analyses with the honor
group, results became stronger, suggesting that the efforts of the honor
group participants were not simply about wanting to get credit for a
good deed (Honor vs. Nonhonor Group  Violence Endorsement 
Favor to Repay interaction: t –3.24, p .002; simple interaction of
Honor vs. Nonhonor Group  Violence Endorsement in the favor to
repay condition: t 3.69, p .001). (For more on this issue, see also
Experiment 2, involving an anonymous situation where one would
not get credit for good behavior.)
Effect of disk type. As may be recalled, for half the partic-
ipants the disk was relatively important, because it had a term
paper on it. For the other half, the disk was unimportant, as it had
an old softball schedule on it. The importance of the disk did not
qualify any of the three-way interactions above; thus, the key
CuPS interactions appeared to hold regardless of whether the disk
was important or trivial.
Discussion
Experiment 1 illustrates the usefulness of the CuPS approach for
understanding behaviors related to prosocial reciprocity, violence,
and inalienable versus socially conferred worth. Dignity, face, and
honor cultures have very different cultural logics. The ideal of
honor connects paying back favors and paying back insults
through the salient cultural theme of reciprocity. The ideals of face
and dignity connect paying back favors and not paying back insults
through salient cultural themes about either preserving group har-
mony (for the face culture) or being sturdy in one’s integrity (for
the dignity culture; Cohen, 2010; IJzerman & Cohen, 2010).
It is not the case that everyone within a culture follows the ideals
of his or her culture. Rather, there are individual differences, and
the ideals of honor, dignity, and face are what individuals react
toward or against in their respective cultures. The Culture 
Person  Situation interactions in this study illustrate the impor-
tance of considering both cultural logics and individual differ-
ences, because the culture variable effectively flips the individual
difference variable on its head in this experiment. Southerners and
Latinos who were most endorsing of honor-related violence were
also the ones who went the furthest to repay a favor, whereas Asian
Americans and Northern Anglos who most endorsed honor-related
violence were the ones who were least likely to return a favor.
Thus, the type of person most likely to return a favor in one culture
was also the type of person least likely to do so in the other culture.
Similarly, when it came to ideas about inalienable versus so-
cially conferred worth, among the dignity group (Northern Ang-
4 We thank Daphna Oyserman for this observation.
Table 3
Regression Analyses Predicting Participants’ Effort Expended to Help the Disk Confederate for
CuPS Interaction Involving Endorsement of Inalienable Versus Socially Conferred Worth
(Experiment 1)
Variable b SE of b  t p
Dignity group vs. face/honor group (C) .08 .09 .08 0.80 .43
Individual endorsement of inalienable vs.
socially conferred worth (P) .04 .09 .04 0.46 .64
Favor to repay or not (S) .02 .09 .02 0.24 .81
C  S .12 .09 .12 1.31 .19
P  S .06 .09 .06 0.67 .51
C  P .02 .09 .02 0.17 .86
C  P  S .25 .09 .25 2.69 .01
Note. N  119. Change in R2 after adding the Culture  Person  Situation (CuPS) interaction to the model 
.06. All variables standardized before creating interaction terms and entered in the model. Higher numbers for
the variables indicate that the participant was from a face/honor group (vs. dignity group), endorsed inalienable
(vs. socially conferred) worth, and did not have a favor to repay.
 p  .05.
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los), those most endorsing of inalienable worth were the most
likely to return a favor. In contrast, among the face and honor
groups, rejecting inalienable worth was no marker of a lack of
sturdiness or a tendency toward expediency. Among those from
face or honor cultures, participants endorsing the idea of socially
conferred worth were at least as likely to pay back a favor as those
endorsing inalienable worth.
Experiment 2: Being Honest and Trustworthy in
Honor, Face, and Dignity Cultures
Experiment 2 extended the results of Experiment 1 in a few ways:
First, we examined how dignity, honor, and face relate to another
indicator of integrity, namely, willingness to cheat on a memory test
for money. Second, we examined a completely anonymous and un-
monitored situation. In Experiment 1, a diligent participant might
receive the confederate’s gratitude for returning the disk. In Experi-
ment 2, the anonymity of the situation means there is no extrinsic
reward or recognition for not cheating (see also the Further Analyses
section in Experiment 1). Third, we included an exploratory measure
specifically designed to measure face, adapting Zane and Yeh’s
(2002) Loss of Face Scale to stress what was distinctive about face
cultures, such as the emphasis on humility and the mostly downward
focus on trying not to lose face. (As noted earlier, honor can be gained
or lost; in any given interaction, concern with face tends to be more
focused on preventing loss.)
Experimentally Manipulating the Salience of a
Cultural Ideal
Most important, we examined the effect of priming honor in
Experiment 2. Half of the participants saw the honor-violence film
clips before taking the memory test, and half saw the clips afterward.
Priming honor in the present experiment allows us to do two things.
First, it strengthens the causal claim that honor is the ideal that
Southerners and Latinos are reacting toward or against; second, it
allows us to show that this reacting toward or against salient ideals is
a dynamic process (Benet-Martı´nez et al., 2002; Hong, Morris, Chiu,
& Benet-Martı´nez, 2000; Oyserman & Lee, 2008a; Suh, Diener, &
Updegraff, 2008). Dignity is the dominant discourse in mainstream
American culture; in the context of this study (a scientific experiment
in the psychology building on a Northern, predominately White
campus), it may be that dignity is the reigning ideal that our partici-
pants react toward or against. Showing the film clips, however, should
make the honor schema salient for Southerners and Latinos, and once
salient, honor (not dignity) should become the cultural ideal that
Southerners and Latinos react toward or against. Consequently, mak-
ing the honor syndrome salient is expected to decrease cheating
among the Southern and Latino participants who buy into the honor
ideal. (Honor goes with paying back insults and being good for your
word as an honest and trustworthy person.) Conversely, the film clips
should increase cheating among the Southern and Latino participants
who reject the honor syndrome, because the clips make salient an
honor ideal that they react against—and again, this honor ideal pack-
ages together both the integrity to stand up for oneself against insult
and the integrity to do what is right (in this case, resist cheating).
To restate a central argument of this article in more general
form: Different cultures are organized by different cultural logics.
These logics define certain behaviors as going together. And as
individuals react toward or against the salient ideals of their
culture, different characteristic patterns of behavior emerge. The
priming manipulation in Experiment 2 lets us look at this process
in vivo as our bicultural Latinos and Southerners react toward or
against either a dignity ideal or an honor ideal—with consequences
for increases and decreases in cheating behavior. Experiment 1 (in
which everyone saw the film clips first) could demonstrate people
reacting toward or against salient ideals in a static fashion, but the
current study lets us look at this as a dynamic process with low- (or
high-) violence endorsing Southerners and Latinos reacting very
differently when honor (as opposed to dignity) is the salient ideal.
For Northern Anglos and Asian Americans, dignity and face (not
honor) are the cultural syndromes that one reacts toward or against.
For Northerners and Asian Americans, the violent protagonist in the
film clips does not represent a person protecting his honor; rather, the
violent protagonist represents a person who has lost his self-control
and is behaving in an immature, inappropriate, or aggressive way.
Thus, for the Northern and Asian American groups, showing them the
violent film clips should have no salutary effect on their behavior—
except to the extent that it reminds low-violence Northern Anglos and
Asian Americans of what they must not do.
CuPS Interaction Involving Dignity Versus
Nondignity Cultures
In addition to priming the honor ideal (or not), the second
between-subjects manipulation in this study involved the experi-
menter casually offering half the participants a piece of gum before
the study began. A person has an obligation not to cheat others—
especially those others who have been nice to him or her. We
expected that those Northern Anglos who endorsed dignity’s ideal
of inalienable worth would be most likely to meet this obligation,
compared with those Northern Anglos who rejected this ideal.
Among the face and honor groups, we did not expect such an effect
because a rejection of inalienable worth does not indicate a lack of
sturdiness or integrity.
CuPS Interaction Involving Face Versus
Nonface Cultures
Our expectation for the exploratory face measure followed a
similar reasoning. If face is the dominant ideal that Asian Amer-
icans react toward or against, then offering Asian American par-
ticipants a stick of gum should make those who buy into the ideal
of face relatively less likely to cheat and make those who reject the
ideal of face relatively more likely to cheat. Because our other
groups do not hold face as a dominant ideal to react toward or
against, this interaction effect involving the face variable should
not occur for them.
Method
Participants. Participants were 119 University of Illinois
students (37 Northern Anglos, 27 Southern Anglos, 23 Latinos,
and 32 Asian Americans). Our dignity, honor, and face groups
were 49% (51%), 64% (36%), and 41% (59%) female (male),
respectively. Our honor group thus had a marginally greater pro-
portion of women ( p  .10). However, in our results, there was no
main effect of gender ( p  .76), gender did not interact with our
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predicted three-way interaction involving honor ( p  .96), and
gender did not interact with any other variable in the model (all ps
nonsignificant). Thus, for this experiment as in Experiment 1, we
collapsed across gender in our analyses.
Procedure. Participants were run individually and told that
the experiment was to examine people’s attitudes toward violence
(i.e., the movie viewing task) and how arousal caused by watching
violence can affect people’s retention and retrieval of information
(i.e., the recall task). As noted above, two between-subjects vari-
ables were introduced. First, as a reciprocity manipulation, the
experimenter casually offered half the participants a piece of gum
before the study had “officially” started. Second, the order of the
tasks was manipulated, such that half the participants watched the
honor-violence film clips first (i.e., honor was primed) and half did
the memory test first (i.e., honor was not primed).
Movie task: Getting the endorsement of honor violence, the
endorsement of inalienable versus socially conferred worth, and
the exploratory measure of face. Participants watched and rated
the four film clips and then completed a questionnaire that in-
cluded the inalienable versus socially conferred worth questions
(see the Measures section in Experiment 1) as well as an explor-
atory measure of face. For the latter, we used the Loss of Face
Scale (e.g., “I maintain a low profile because I do not want to make
mistakes in front of other people”; Zane & Yeh, 2002), but to
emphasize the distinct features of face (vs. honor and dignity), we
dropped the four questions that were conceivably related to insult
and affront (someone criticizes, embarrasses, or treats me un-
fairly). We also dropped two questions that were neutral with
respect to loss or gain of status and substituted two questions we
created ourselves. Of these two new questions, one item had to do
with humility (“If you won an award, you would tell your friends”
[reverse scored]), and the other item was particularly relevant to
student situations (“You do not want to ask questions in class
because other students may think about how stupid you are to ask
such questions.”). Participants indicated their degree of agreement
with the statements on a 7-point scale (1  strongly disagree to
7  strongly agree). The 17-item adapted scale had an alpha
of .82.
An overview of the recall task: Getting the measure of cheat-
ing. For our recall task, we modified procedures used in Hous-
ton (1978) and Houston and Ziff (1976). The task involved two
trials in which participants studied word lists and then tried to
recall as many words as possible. During the second recall trial,
one page of the word lists was “accidentally” left exposed, allow-
ing participants to copy words from this portion of the list. From
participants’ answer sheets we could not get a perfect measure of
cheating by an individual, but we could infer the probability that
the person cheated. For those who did not cheat, one would expect
about half the words to come from the exposed list, but as the
percentage of words from the exposed list increases, so does the
likelihood that the person cheated.
Detailed procedure of the recall task. In the recall task, the
participant was to study a two-page word list (48 words on each
page) for 2 min and then recall as many words as possible for 3
min. We used an overhead projector to show the word list (printed
on two transparencies laid side-by-side) during the 2-min study
phase. The experimenter covered the transparencies so that only
four words at a time were shown (two from page 1 and two from
page 2). After approximately 5 s, she moved on to the next row of
four words until all 24 lines of words were shown.
When the study phase was over, the participant wrote down as
many words as he or she could remember in 3 min (there was a
timer on his or her desk). After the first trial (a practice trial), the
experimenter explained that in the next trial, the participant could
win money based on his or her performance. More specifically, he
or she would win $1 for every remembered word over 20 (up to
$15). Thus, a participant who recalled 30 words would win $10.
The experimenter then roughly checked the participant’s answers
in the practice trial against an alphabetical word list, commenting
that the participant had done a pretty good job and had a fair
chance of winning some money (see Houston, 1978).
In the second trial, the study phase was repeated with the same
word list. However, before the memory test phase began, the
experimenter caught sight of a checklist that reminded her, among
other things, that she had forgotten to check for money in the cash
box. After finding no money there, the experimenter excused
herself to look for money in another room. The experimenter
returned a bit flustered and apologetic, explaining that she would
have to run to the finance office on the 8th floor to get some
money. This would take about 10 min. However, for the experi-
ment to end on time, the participant would have to start the recall
task right away and just stop when the timer indicated the trial
should end. Hurriedly, the experimenter scribbled down an ac-
count number on a piece of paper, pulled the paper off her
clipboard, mindlessly set the clipboard down on a table near the
participant, and left the room. Removing the paper from the
clipboard left one of the lists exposed. (The other list had been
surreptitiously hidden when the experimenter looked for money in
the other room.) The exposed list used 16-point font and was
positioned so that the participant could read it discreetly without
moving. When the oblivious experimenter returned with the cash,
she simply checked the participant’s answers against an alphabet-
ical list. And, if the memory test was the last task, the experimenter
paid the participant any money he or she had won and ended the
study with a thorough debriefing.5
Results
We first used the number of words a participant recalled from
the exposed list and the total number of words recalled to compute
rho (	)—the probability that the participant would have recalled at
least that many words from the exposed list by chance alone.
Lower values of rho thus indicate a greater likelihood that the
participant cheated. (Rho was calculated using the binomial cu-
mulative distribution function; it can be analogized to a statistical
significance level in that it is the probability of observing a result
at least as extreme as the one obtained if the null hypothesis that
the participant recalled words from the exposed list at chance
levels [50%] were true.) A square-root transformation was then
applied to rho to pull in cases where rho was exceptionally high
(i.e., cases where the percentage of words from the exposed list
5 Debriefings also allowed us to probe for suspicion. Across Experi-
ments 1 and 2, 12% of participants expressed at least some suspicion.
When these participants were removed from the analyses, the conclusions
of the two experiments remained unchanged.
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was exceptionally below 50%). Intuitively, the difference between
someone who recalled 70% of their answers from the exposed list
and someone who recalled 60% of their answers from the exposed
list should be bigger than the difference between someone who
recalled 30% from the exposed list and someone who recalled 40%
from the exposed list. In the 30% versus 40% case, both persons
recalled words from the exposed list at below chance levels.6
Analytic strategy. We used the same analytic strategy as in
Experiment 1. There were two key Culture  Person  Situation
interactions. The first was an Honor Versus Nonhonor Group
(Culture)  Individual Endorsement of Violence (Person)  Vi-
olent Film Clip Prime Versus No Prime (Situation) interaction.
The second was a Dignity Group Versus Face/Honor Group (Cul-
ture)  Individual Endorsement of Inalienable Versus Socially
Conferred Worth (Person)  Offered Gum Versus Not Offered
Gum (Situation) interaction. Our person-level variables were con-
tinuous, and thus we used multiple regression, as in Experiment 1.
Data in the figures are expressed in terms of rho, the probability of
the participant recalling at least as many exposed words if he or
she were doing so by chance alone.
CuPS interaction involving the effect of the film clip prime:
Honor violence and cheating in honor and nonhonor groups.
The main manipulated variable in this study was the presence or
absence of the violent film clip prime. The expected three-way
interaction between Honor Versus Nonhonor Group  Endorse-
ment of Violence  Prime Versus No Prime was significant (b 
–.06,   –.19, t  –2.08, p  .04; see Figure 4 and Table 4). In
decomposing the three-way interaction, we begin with the honor
group (Southerners and Latinos). For them, the prime of the film
clips was supposed to make salient the ideals of the honor syn-
drome; primed with honor ideals, individuals who endorsed this
system (as indicated by their endorsement of honor-related vio-
lence) would then cheat less, whereas individuals who rejected this
system (as indicated by their disapproval of honor-related vio-
lence) would then cheat more (Endorsement of Violence  Prime
for the Honor Group: b  –.09,   –.27, t  1.94, p  .05). This
effect of the prime manipulation helps illustrate the causal role of
honor as a salient ideal that individuals from honor cultures react
toward or against—with consequences for a constellation of dis-
parate but honor-related behaviors (in this case, being honest). As
the prime highlighted honor ideals, high honor-violence and low
honor-violence people from this group were not just endorsing or
rejecting honor-related violence; they were endorsing or rejecting
the honor syndrome and all that it entailed (including honesty).
For our nonhonor groups (Asian Americans and Northern An-
glos), on the other hand, face and dignity (not honor) are the
cultural syndromes that they react toward or against. Thus, for
individuals from this group, the more they endorsed violence, the
more they cheated (simple effect of violence for nonhonor group:
b  –.09,   –.29, t  –2.49, p  .01). This connection between
more violence and more cheating was not qualified by any inter-
action with priming condition; thus, watching the film clips had no
salutary effect on Asian Americans and Northern Anglos who
endorsed violence (Endorsement of Violence  Prime interaction:
b  .04, t  0.94, p  .35).
Further analyses among honor culture participants: Suscep-
tibility to having the prime shift the salient cultural ideal. As
noted above, there was a Violence Endorsement  Prime interac-
tion among the honor group, such that the prime shifting the
cultural ideal made those more endorsing of violence become
relatively more honest and those less endorsing of violence be-
come relatively less honest. The prime was particularly effective
among honor group members most steeped in the culture-of-honor
ethos. Further analyses of Southerners in the prime condition
showed that among those who had spent at least 18 years of their
life in the South, there was a very strong positive relationship
between endorsement of violence and honest behavior (r  .87,
p  .01, n  8). The prime was not so effective in shifting the
cultural ideal for those participants who were classified as South-
ern but had not grown up entirely in the South (r  –.97, n  5).
(In a regression treating percentage of life in the South as a
continuous variable, the Percentage of Life in the South  Vio-
lence Endorsement interaction indeed predicted honest behavior
among primed Southerners; b  .37,   .68, t  2.54, p  .03,
n  13.) Caution in interpreting these results is needed because of
the small sample size. However, the result seems in accord with
the more general point that the effectiveness of a cultural prime
depends on (a) the strength of the prime (e.g., watching a few film
clips vs. watching 5 hr of John Wayne films) and (b) a given
participant’s susceptibility to being primed by a certain stimulus
(Cheng, Lee, & Benet-Martı´nez, 2006; Cohen, 2007; Norenzayan
& Heine, 2005).
CuPS interaction involving the effect of the gum manipula-
tion: Endorsement of inalienable versus socially conferred worth
and cheating in dignity versus face/honor groups. We also
examined our other individual difference variable (inalienable vs.
social worth) in terms of how it interacted with whether the
participant was from a dignity versus a face/honor culture and
whether the participant had been offered gum by the experimenter.
A person has a duty not to cheat others—especially when those
others have been nice to him or her. Among Northern Anglos, we
expected that those who most endorsed the dignity ideal of in-
alienable worth would be most likely to fulfill this duty, whereas
those who rejected this ideal would also be most likely to reject
this duty. Among face/honor groups, we would not expect this
pattern, because rejection of the ideal of inalienable worth does not
indicate a lack of personal integrity.
The predicted three-way interaction of Dignity Versus Face/
Honor Culture  Inalienable Versus Socially Conferred Worth 
Gum Offer was significant (b  .06,   .19, t  2.08, p  .04;
see Figure 5 and Table 5). As expected, among Northern Anglos,
those who endorsed the dignity ideal of inalienable worth became
less likely to cheat after the gum offer, whereas those who rejected
inalienable worth also seemed to reject the duty brought upon them
by the gift of the gum, and they became more likely to cheat
(Inalienable vs. Socially Conferred Worth  Gum Offer interac-
6 One can also use the percentage of words from the exposed list as the
dependent variable, but this variable has outliers. With this dependent
variable, the p levels for the two key three-way interactions (one involving
violence endorsement and the other involving inalienable vs. socially
conferred worth) were both significant, and this was true regardless of
whether one included or excluded the outliers (all ps  .05). In the case of
the simple two-way interactions, the p levels were .06 for the Endorsement
of Violence  Prime interaction for the honor group and .02 for the
Inalienable Versus Social Worth  Gum Offer interaction among Northern
Anglos, when outliers were excluded. The p levels for the two-way
interactions were .13 and .01 if outliers were included, respectively.
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tion among Northern Anglos: b  –.11,   –.36, t  –2.24, p 
.03). Among face/honor groups, this interaction effect did not hold
(Inalienable vs. Socially Conferred Worth  Gum Offer interac-
tion among face/honor groups: b  .02, t  0.45, p  .66). For the
face/honor groups, a rejection of the idea of inalienable worth was
not a marker for lack of integrity.
CuPS interaction involving the effect of the gum manipula-
tion: Loss of Face Scale and cheating in face versus dignity/
honor groups. The predicted three-way interaction of Face
Versus Dignity/Honor Culture  Endorsement on Loss of Face
Scale  Gum Offer was marginally significant (b  .06,   .19,
t  1.79, p  .08; see Figure 6 and Table 6). As expected, among
Asian Americans, those most concerned with face became less
likely to cheat after the offer of the gum, whereas those uncon-
cerned with face seemed to reject the duty brought upon them by
the gift of the gum, and they became more likely to cheat (Loss of
Face Scale Endorsement  Gum Offer interaction among Asian
Americans: b  –.14,   –.46, t  –2.08, p  .04). Among the
nonface groups, this interaction did not hold (two-way interaction:
t  –0.20, p  .84). For them, a lack of concern with face did not
predict honesty or dishonesty.
Discussion
In sum, Experiment 2 showed the usefulness of a CuPS ap-
proach with a very different sort of behavior than that in Experi-
ment 1. Further, through the use of a priming manipulation, Ex-
periment 2 strengthened the causal claim that behavioral
differences among Southerners and Latinos are driven by an indi-
vidual’s response toward or against honor norms. For Southern and
Latino participants, the film clips made honor ideals salient and
decreased cheating among those endorsing honor-related violence,
whereas they increased cheating among those rejecting such vio-
lence. The present experiment demonstrated in dynamic form what
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Figure 4. Probability that a participant’s recall of words from the exposed list was due to chance alone. Higher
numbers thus imply greater honesty. Probabilities are displayed as a function of whether the participant is from
an honor or nonhonor group, the individual’s stance on honor-related violence (1 SD below and above the mean),
and priming condition. The Culture  Person  Situation (Honor vs. Nonhonor Groups  Honor-Violence
Endorsement  Film Clip Prime vs. No Prime) three-way interaction was significant at p  .04.
Table 4
Regression Analyses Predicting the Probability That Participants’ Recall of Exposed Words Was
Due to Chance Alone for CuPS Interaction Involving Endorsement of Honor-Related Violence
(Experiment 2)
Variable b SE of b  t p
Honor group vs. nonhonor group (C) .02 .03 .07 0.71 .47
Individual endorsement of honor violence (P) .07 .03 .21 2.31 .02
Primed with film clips vs. not primed (S) .01 .03 .04 0.38 .71
C  S .03 .03 .08 0.93 .36
P  S .02 .03 .05 0.51 .61
C  P .03 .03 .09 1.03 .30
C  P  S .06 .03 .19 2.08 .04
Note. N  119. Change in R2 after the Culture  Person  Situation (CuPS) interaction was added to the
model  .03. All variables standardized before creating interaction terms and entered in the model. Higher
numbers for the variables indicate that the participant was from an honor group (vs. nonhonor group), approved
more of honor-related violence, and was not primed with the film clips. The dependent variable was square-root
transformed.
 p  .05.
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Experiment 1 had demonstrated in static form—that people react
toward or against salient cultural ideals, that one’s stance on
retributive violence positions oneself as either an endorser or
rejecter of those ideals, and that this endorsing or rejecting has
implications for a range of behaviors that are organized in different
ways by different cultures according to their own particular cul-
tural logic. As expected, the prime had little effect on those from
dignity and face cultures. For these nonhonor groups, more en-
dorsement of violence simply correlated with more cheating.
Experiment 2 also replicated and extended the findings of Ex-
periment 1 with respect to a dignity culture’s ideals of inalienable
worth. Among Northern Anglos given gum, those endorsing in-
alienable worth were the least likely to cheat. Among the face/
honor groups, rejection of inalienable worth does not indicate a
lack of sturdiness, and no such effect occurred for them.
Finally, we look at the CuPS interaction involving the modified
Loss of Face Scale. Among our Asian Americans, those who scored
high on the face measure were less likely to cheat after being given
gum, whereas those unconcerned with face became relatively more
likely to cheat. Among the dignity and honor groups, face is not the
dominant syndrome that they react toward or against, so concern with
face predicted little, and the effect did not occur for them.
General Discussion
It is important to understand individual variation in a cultural
context. Culture is important because it helps define psychological
situations and create meaningful clusters of behavior according to
a particular cultural logic. Individual differences are important
because individuals vary in the extent to which they internalize or
Figure 5. Probability that a participant’s recall of words from the exposed list was due to chance alone. Higher
numbers thus imply greater honesty. Probabilities are displayed as a function of whether the participant is from
a dignity or a face/honor group, the individual’s stance on inalienable versus socially conferred worth (1 SD
below and above the mean), and whether he or she was offered gum. The Culture  Person  Situation (Dignity
vs. Face/Honor Groups  Endorsement of Inalienable vs. Socially Conferred Worth  Gum vs. No Gum)
three-way interaction was significant at p  .04.
Table 5
Regression Analyses Predicting the Probability That Participants’ Recall of Exposed Words Was
Due to Chance Alone for CuPS Interaction Involving Endorsement of Inalienable Versus
Socially Conferred Worth (Experiment 2)
Variable b SE of b  t p
Dignity group vs. face/honor group (C) .07 .03 .24 2.60 .01
Individual endorsement of inalienable vs.
socially conferred worth (P) .03 .03 .10 1.04 .26
Offered gum or not (S) .01 .03 .03 0.34 .74
C  S 0 .03 .01 0.10 .92
P  S .02 .03 .08 0.84 .40
C  P .03 .03 .10 1.14 .30
C  P  S .06 .03 .19 2.08 .04
Note. N  119. Change in R2 after the Culture  Person  Situation (CuPS) interaction was added to the model 
.03. All variables standardized before creating interaction terms and entered in the model. Higher numbers for the
variables indicate that the participant was from a face/honor group (vs. dignity group), endorsed inalienable (vs.
socially conferred) worth, and was not offered gum. The dependent variable was square-root transformed.
 p  .05.
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endorse (or reject) a cultural syndrome. Individuals are always in
a cultural context, though they are not always of it.
The CuPS perspective helps explain how the type of person in one
culture who is most likely to positively reciprocate, be honest, and
show integrity is also the type of person in another culture who is least
likely to do so. Thus, among those from nonhonor cultures (North-
erners and Asian Americans), the people who endorsed violence in
response to threat or affront were also the people who were least likely
to reciprocate a favor and most likely to cheat. However, among those
from honor cultures (Southerners and Latinos), the people who en-
dorsed violence in response to threat or affront were the people who
were most likely to reciprocate a favor and most likely to show
increased honesty once honor had been primed.
The same sort of pattern held for endorsing the ideal of inalien-
able versus socially conferred worth. Among those from a culture
of dignity (Northerners), greater endorsement of inalienable worth
meant greater likelihood of reciprocating a favor and greater
honesty. Among nondignity groups, a belief in inalienable worth
does not indicate sturdiness, and a belief in socially conferred
worth does not indicate weakness of character, and so no such
inalienable versus social worth effect occurred for them.
Our exploratory face measure in Experiment 2 yielded similar
results, showing how face is the dominant ideal that Asian Amer-
icans react toward or against. Asian Americans with a greater
concern for face were relatively less likely to cheat the experi-
menter who had been nice to them, and those with little concern for
face were relatively more likely to cheat her. Among the nonface
groups, concern with face did not predict their honesty.
Reacting Toward or Against: A Dynamic Process
Experiment 2 also illustrated the general argument of this article
in dynamic form, recapitulating in microcosm our argument that
individuals are always in a cultural context, though they are not
Figure 6. Probability that a participant’s recall of words from the exposed list was due to chance alone. Higher
numbers thus imply greater honesty. Probabilities are displayed as a function of whether the participant is from
a face or an honor/dignity group, the individual’s endorsement on the modified Loss of Face Scale (1 SD below
and above the mean), and whether he or she was offered gum. The Culture  Person  Situation (Face vs.
Honor/Dignity Groups  Endorsement on the Modified Loss of Face Scale  Gum vs. No Gum) three-way
interaction was marginally significant at p  .08.
Table 6
Regression Analyses Predicting the Probability That Participants’ Recall of Exposed Words Was
Due to Chance Alone for CuPS Interaction Involving Endorsement on the Modified Loss of Face
Scale (Experiment 2)
Variable b SE of b  t p
Face group vs. honor/dignity group (C) .003 .03 .01 0.08 .94
Individual endorsement of face (P) .01 .03 .02 0.20 .84
Offered gum or not (S) .04 .03 .12 1.24 .22
C  S .01 .03 .04 0.34 .74
P  S .04 .03 .14 1.41 .16
C  P .05 .03 .16 1.56 .12
C  P  S .06 .03 .19 1.79 .08
Note. N  119. Change in R2 after the Culture  Person  Situation (CuPS) interaction was added to the
model  .03. All variables standardized before creating interaction terms and entered in the model. Higher
numbers for the variables indicate that the participant was from an honor/dignity group (vs. face group), endorsed
face (vs. not), and was not offered gum. The dependent variable was square-root transformed.
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always of it (Benet-Martı´nez et al., 2002; Hong et al., 2000; Oishi,
2004; Zou, Morris, & Benet-Martı´nez, 2008). To illustrate con-
cretely the process highlighted by Experiment 2, take two Southern
or Latino individuals—Person A who endorses the notion that one
must avenge insults and Person B who adheres to the “sticks and
stones . . .” motto and shrugs off insults. Put them in a situation
where dignity is presumed to be the salient cultural ideal that one
reacts toward or against (e.g., a situation such as a scientific lab
experiment on the Illinois campus). In this context, Person A is a
rejecter of the dignity ideal and thus a rejecter of dignity’s imper-
ative toward honesty. Person B is an endorser of dignity’s ideal
and thus a follower of dignity’s imperative toward honesty.
Change the cultural schema to which they are reacting, however,
and Person A changes from being a rejecter of dignity to an
endorser of honor and honor’s imperative toward honesty. Con-
versely, Person B changes from being an endorser of dignity to a
rejecter of honor and honor’s honesty imperative. Defining oneself
as a rejecter of dignity means one is more likely to cheat; defining
oneself as an endorser of honor does not. More generally, being a
rejecter of Syndrome 1 is not the same as being an endorser of
Syndrome 2, and so we must understand the particular cultural
syndrome a person is reacting toward or against to predict behav-
ior.
Individuals are always in a cultural context; however, especially
for bicultural individuals, the cultural context they are in and
reacting toward or against may change according to the situation.
And this is presumably true whether situation is defined in terms
of the short-term immediate surroundings or in terms of the long-
term contexts of the neighborhoods, families, and social networks
we find ourselves in (Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, & Coon, 2002;
Oyserman & Lee, 2008a, 2008b; Oyserman & Sorensen, 2009;
Steele, 1999).
Cultural Rejectionism
The interactive framework of CuPS helps one understand be-
havior that might seem anomalous or even bizarre from other
perspectives. In the CuPS framework, people are active agents
within a cultural system, reacting toward or against the dominant
organizing syndrome of their culture. Recall that in Experiment 1,
people from an honor culture who reject violence actually showed
less effort to help our confederate when they owed her a favor
(simple slope of favor to repay among honor group participants,
centered at 1 SD below the violence mean: b  .36,   .36, t 
1.92, p  .06). Recall also that in Experiment 2, people from a
dignity culture who reject dignity ideals actually seemed more
likely to cheat after they were offered gum (simple slope of gum
offer among dignity group participants, centered at 1 SD below the
inalienable worth mean: b  .11,   .37, t  1.69, p  .09). Why
would people be less helpful and more dishonest when conditions
place upon them greater obligations to behave appropriately? The
answer is that people are reacting against the dominant ideals of
their culture. People from an honor culture who actively reject the
concept of honor are also actively rejecting the ideals of reciproc-
ity and a package of honor-related beliefs and behaviors, and thus
they are less likely to help when it is most incumbent upon them
to do so. Similarly, those from a dignity culture who reject the
ideals of dignity are also actively rejecting a whole set of beliefs,
norms, and ideals that would place upon them greater obligations
to not cheat. From a CuPS perspective, these data are not bizarre,
because they show how rejectionist behavior is culturally situated
and packaged (as opposed to simply “acultural”).
Of course, one hesitates to put too much faith in these two
marginally significant results. However, both the above effects
become significant at p  .05 when centered at 1.5 SDs (instead
of 1 SD) above or below the mean (Aiken & West, 1991). More
important, the general pattern of the data is relatively consis-
tent: Cultural rejecters—that is, those who reject the dominant
ideals of their respective cultures— cheat more and help less
when the weight of social obligation presses heaviest upon
them. For additional support, see also Figure 3 where (a)
Northern Anglos who reject inalienable worth and (b) those
from face/honor groups who reject socially conferred worth
become less helpful to our confederate when they owe her a
favor (simple slope of favor to repay: b  .23,   .33, t 
2.55, p  .01, for those 1 SD above the mean on cultural
rejectionism, where rejectionism is defined by low scores on the
inalienable worth measure for Northern Anglos and by high
scores on the inalienable worth measure for participants from
the face and honor groups).
How regularly such rejectionism effects occur outside the lab
is an open question. Ultimately, this question will not be fully
answered until culture researchers take into account individual
differences, personality researchers take into account culture,
and both take into account situational press. Issues of frequency
aside, however, rejectionism effects such as those in the exper-
iments that might seem weird or anomalous from other perspec-
tives are not at all strange from a CuPS perspective (for other
examples of cultural rejectionism, see Cheng et al., 2006; Zou
et al., 2008).
A Contrast and a Clarification
Contrast. The CuPS approach considers culture, person, and
situation together to try to develop an integrated approach to
studying between- and within-culture variation. It contrasts with
the standard cultural approach that attends less to individual dif-
ferences and concentrates on the cultural prototype. It contrasts
with the standard individual difference approach that attends less
to the way an individual difference variable means different things
in different cultures. Further, it contrasts with any approach that
tries to reduce culture to individual differences while ignoring the
logics of the cultural syndromes under study (see Cohen & Leung,
2010; Leung & Cohen, 2007; Leung, Kim, Zhang, Tam, & Chiu,
2010, for other empirical work illustrating the usefulness of the
CuPS approach). A lack of consideration of individual differences
ultimately helped lead to the demise of one wing of the old
culture-and-personality movement and studies of “national char-
acter” (LeVine, 2001). By treating the individual as an active agent
within a cultural system, the CuPS approach tries to avoid this
pitfall while also understanding the massive effect of culture on
human behavior. The effect of culture is huge; it is just that people
are not passive recipients of their culture, and so the effects are not
uniform.
Clarification. We do believe that main effects of culture,
individual differences, and situations are important and should
be studied. We do not believe every phenomenon needs to be
analyzed in terms of higher order interactions. As a practical
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matter, this would pose some difficulties. More important, we
reject this idea theoretically. There are commonalities across all
cultures that derive from human sociality. And it would be a
very strange world indeed if every culture had a cultural logic
that was dramatically different from that of every other culture,
and if every individual difference variable or every situation
meant something quite different in every culture that was stud-
ied (see, e.g., Gilmore, 1990, but cf. chapters 9 and 10; Van-
dello, Bosson, Cohen, Burnaford, & Weaver, 2008).7
However, as with the experiments above, the CuPS approach
illustrates the importance of culture, person, and situation vari-
ables considered together and the hazards of leaving any of
these variables out. With respect to the hazards, for example, if
one took the standard individual difference perspective and
collapsed across cultures in Experiments 1 and 2, one would
have found little in the way of effects and would have con-
cluded that the individual difference variables were not that
important. Or if one took the standard culture perspective and
collapsed across individual differences, one would have found
little in the way of effects and would have underappreciated the
importance of culture. Thus, individual difference researchers
who collapse across cultures and culture researchers who col-
lapse across individual differences may miss not only the sig-
nificance of the collapsed-across variables but the significance
of their own variable of interest as well. (For another example
of this point, see the CuPS interactions that emerge in the more
specific case of Culture  Gene  Environment interactions;
Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010; H. S. Kim et al., 2009.)
Finally, one issue we have not addressed is why individuals
might endorse or reject the ideals of their culture in the first
place. Perhaps some of this is due to matters of individual
temperament that are either congruent or incongruent with
cultural norms (Rozin, 2003). Perhaps some of this is due to
socialization into various microcultures (of, e.g., neighbor-
hoods, peers, or families) that align with or oppose norms of the
wider society (Anderson, 1994). Perhaps some of this is due to
the particular roles people inhabit within those microcultures
(Merton, 1938; Plomin & Daniels, 1987; Sulloway, 1997).
Related to this latter point, we believe that understanding the
niches people occupy within a culture or subculture is a partic-
ularly promising area for future research. Moreover, we think
that it will be useful to understand from an individual’s per-
spective what are the benefits and costs—material, psycholog-
ical, and social—that he or she accrues by aligning him- or
herself with or against a given set of norms (Bond et al., 2009;
Dach-Gruschow, Hernandez, & Cohen, 2010; Konner, 2007;
Schachter, 1951; Vaillant, 1993).
Conclusion
As seen above, the CuPS approach is only a rudimentary start
on an approach to understanding people as individuals who
necessarily operate in a cultural context. It is simplistic, but it
tries to reconcile the study of individual differences and the
study of culture, such that neither is viewed as error and neither
is substitutable for the other (such as when culture is treated as
simply an aggregation of individual differences). The CuPS
approach to reconciliation requires understanding the particular
cultural logics that provide meaning and frame people’s
choices. The promise of such an approach that jointly considers
both culture and individual differences is an integrated account
that can capture more of the within- and between-culture vari-
ation in human behavior.
7 In the present article, with respect to the issue of “universal” individual
difference effects, one might ask if the results of these studies are just a
demonstration of the Folk Theorem that “all good things are correlated .1.”
The answer to that appears to be no and is supported by two points. First, as
seen in Experiment 2, for our bicultural Southerners and Latinos, what is a
“good thing” depends in part on the salient cultural norm they are reacting to.
Thus, the correlations between any two behaviors (in this case, honesty and the
endorsement of retributive violence) can flip depending on the cultural norm
that a person finds him- or herself reacting toward or against. Second, in a short
background questionnaire at the end of the two experiments, we asked partic-
ipants about two conventionally virtuous behaviors: how often they (a) at-
tended church or their place of worship and (b) visited or talked with their
families. If all good things are positively correlated, we would expect to see
that the two virtuous measures can (a) be differentially predicted by our honor
and inalienable versus social worth variables in the three cultural groups, (b)
predict helping and resistance to cheating in our experiments, and (c) substitute
for our honor and inalienable versus social worth measures to produce the
three-way CuPS interactions of interest. However, the family visit and church
attendance variables basically failed all three tests. The general conclusion
from this second set of findings also suggests that one can understand the
experimental results only by understanding what honor, face, and dignity are;
one cannot just treat endorsement of honor, face, and dignity individual
difference variables as simple generic markers for “goodness”—either within
or across cultural contexts.
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